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Made in Bangladesh

A Suggestion

Posted by intelreport on February 4, 2008

Sikder Haseeb Khan & Mashuqur Rahman, widely known as Mash and one of writers of Drishtipat blog have come with their suggestions of proposed National Security Structure with a democratic model. This article has also been published here in Daily Star Forum & here in Drishtipat Writers’ Collective.

 

National security: The democratic model
Mashuqur Rahman | Sikder Haseeb Khan

 

Preserving and protecting national security is one of the most important responsibilities of any government. As foreign policy and national security challenges have become more complex, governments have looked to devise appropriate analytic and decision-making bodies. One such innovation has been the National Security Council.

In democracies that have adopted the National Security Council, the council acts as an advisory body on national security policy to an elected head of government. It is subordinate to the head of government (which in Bangladesh would be the prime minister), and has no authority over the decisions of the government’s chief executive. In its more severe form, however, the National Security Council is often used to exert military control over policy, even after power is handed over to civilian governments (Thailand is an example of this).

Munem Wasif/ Driknews

There has been some discussion recently about forming a National Security Council in Bangladesh. This article aims to add to that discussion by reviewing the role and structure of the National Security Council (NSC) in the United States, which is considered the prototypical example of such a body under a democratic system. While security is the council’s area of concern, the three key features of the US NSC are its restrictive role as an advisory body, its focus on external, not internal, issues, and its mechanism to assert civilian control over security affairs in a democracy.

A purely advisory role
In the United States, the chief executive authority in the government rests with an elected president. The president is also the commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the United States and is responsible for executing the national security policy of the country. To facilitate the president’s decision making, an advisory group called the National Security Council was created in 1947 by a law passed by the US Congress. The law, known as the National Security Act of 1947, was a consequence of lessons learned during the military campaigns of World War II and an anticipated need to coordinate the different “hard” and “soft” dimensions of security during the Cold War. According to the act, the NSC was created to “advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.”

Like its economic counterpart (the National Economic Council), the NSC is part of the Executive Office of the President. Its meetings are chaired by the president, or a person designated by the president, and attended regularly by the vice president and key members of the cabinet, including the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, and the secretary of treasury. Heads of other departments are often invited to attend NSC meetings when appropriate. To help coordinate national security policy and response among the different departments of the government, the president appoints a national security advisor, who acts as White House’s top analyst and focal point on security-related issues.

A focus on external security
In the United States, a strong system of checks and balances keeps foreign and domestic security apart and civilian command firm. There has also been a legal and political tradition of keeping the military out of domestic policy and domestic deployment. James Madison, one of the founders of the American political system, wrote powerfully in 1788: “A standing force, therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a necessary, provision. On the smallest scale it has its inconveniences. On an extensive scale its consequences may be fatal. On any scale it is an object of laudable circumspection and precaution. A wise nation will combine all these considerations; and, whilst it does not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become essential to its safety, will exert all its prudence in diminishing both the necessity and the danger of resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its liberties.” The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 and its update of 1956 formally limited government authority of using the military for enforcing domestic law and order.

This tradition of separating foreign and domestic security has influenced the design of the NSC. The NSC deals mostly with external threats to national security, such as the Soviet threat during the Cold War or the threat of terrorism now. During the Clinton administration, the NSC’s main concerns were the Balkan Wars, Somalia, consequences of the first Gulf War, and the expansion of NATO. In the current administration, the War on Terror is the main concern and the Middle East the primary focus, with secondary concerns around North Korea, China, Pakistan, and an increasingly assertive Russia. In all this, the NSC advises the president and the cabinet on external security — and it is the president who ultimately makes policy decisions to the extent permitted by the Congress.

Control by civilians
It is the same type of checks and balances that keep the control of the NSC in civilian hands. In addition to the civilian heads of departments, the director of National Intelligence and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff attend National Security Council meetings. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consists of the service chiefs of the four major branches of the United States military: the army, the navy, the air force, and the marine corps. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is one of the service chiefs and is appointed to his position after being nominated by the president and confirmed by the United States Senate. The chairman is the only non-civilian member who is a regular attendee of NSC meetings. The chairman attends the meetings in his capacity as the principal military advisor to the president of the United States.

All the service chiefs of the US military, including the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, report to the civilian secretary of defense, who in turn works for the president. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, though they are service chiefs, do not have any command authority over the US military. To separate military advice from military command authority, the US Congress passed a law known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Goldwater-Nichols ensures that the military chain of command in the United States runs firmly from the civilian president, to the civilian secretary of defense, directly to the military combatant commander in the theater of military operations. The service chiefs (Joint Chiefs of Staff) do not have any operational control over the US military and act, through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an advisory role to the president of the United States. This separation of military advice from military chain of command is one of the crucial mechanisms to safeguard civilian control of the military, and thereby national security affairs, in the United States.

A mixed record
In more than half a century of existence the US National Security Council has had a mixed history. Each American president has molded and used the National Security Council according to his own personal style. Some presidents, such as John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, made little use of the National Security Council, relying instead on ad-hoc policy making sessions and personal relationships with department heads. Still other presidents, such as Richard Nixon and George H. W. Bush, relied heavily on the council to gather information and shape national security policy.

Often the effectiveness of the council has depended on the strength of the national security advisor and the advisor’s ability to balance the competing agendas and personalities of the secretary of defense and the secretary of state. Strong national security advisors, such as Henry Kissinger, have had significant influence in using the National Security Council to provide the president with national security policy options, although the policies so formed did not always meet with success and at times led to spectacular failures.

Most recently under President George W. Bush, a weak national security advisor faced with a powerful secretary of defense and a weak secretary of state resulted in a National Security Council that was ineffective in providing the president with informed national security advice. The outcome was a foreign policy blunder and a march to war based on one of the most significant intelligence failures in United States history.

Democratic and the non-democratic parallels
All in all, even in the most powerful country in the world, the NSC has been neither indispensable nor unquestionably successful. But what remains unquestionable is that in the US, the NSC’s role has been restricted carefully to prevent military interference in elected authority. In contrast, in countries like Turkey and Pakistan, such councils are set up essentially to retain and exert military control over a wide range of policy. This is potentially dangerous: it creates an unaccountable authority, compromises the value of democracy, and undermines the professional purpose and integrity of the military by thoroughly politicising it. But one thing that Pakistan and Turkey have in common is that they both face troubling external security environments. Bangladesh faces a far less complex external threat environment; therefore, any perceived benefit of setting up a National Security Council should be weighed carefully.


Tanvir Ahmed/ Driknews

Even in the United States, which faces the most complex external security environment in the world, the National Security Council remains a purely advisory tool for elected governments to use, with a focus on external, not domestic, issues, and commanded in both letter and spirit by civilians, not the military. In a country where power belongs to the people, national security policy has been no exception, even in times of turbulence and war.

(the end)

This extended part of this post (not of the article) has been added due to comments on some basic issues of the article. To go through corresponding discussion, click here

“Mash’s model sounds no inappropriate to me”

Neither to me, because the issue Blazin raised to say it improper (a third world nation issue) does not apply here I guess. Because NS structure of a nation is fully up to that nation’s defense system. If the military likes to have a sound position over there, you have to understand that they deserve that. Particularly in Bangladesh, where one of major NS tools is DGFI, ran by military, Army can demand to have better hold in the National Security Structure.

Now examples of India can be shown to disagree this logic. On the other hand India can be a good example that will make sense that Mash’s suggestions can be taken. Yes I know that in India, their NS structure is less held by military than that of Pakistan or other neighboring nations (I will consider our neighbors, because this extended part is to answer a point under the “third world” issue). I think, this has been possible in India because India has been ruled by Democracy almost all of its time-period. So, their military has been taught that they should not be dreaming to takeover the country in any condition (like Bangladesh Armed Forces did in 1/11). As their government found it easy to develop an NS structure out of strong influence of military. The executive bodies of most of their NS tools (DIA, R&AW, ARC etc.) contain high police-executives, bureaucrats along with army Generals. I was totally thundered after knowing, one of RAW’s heads was once a Kerala Police Commissioner. You know this has been possible in India, just because they have such practice from the beginning. If we go to older days, during the British era, topmost intelligence agency in India was Intelligence Bureau (IB). IB was ran by British intelligence officers who were not from military at all. So, IB was one of initial points of RAW’s (ultimately India’s overall NS Structure) evolution, as it came from a more/less non-military background and RAW ultimately is not a military based intel agency though India’s entire National Security Community is based on RAW. I will strongly state that this has been possible in India not for any mysterious reason, the only reason is India’s central admin has always been ran by a democratic system.

But Bangladesh unfortunately started herself with BAKSLite democracy which never can be called as “democracy” after all. Finally democracy came to Bangladesh in 1991 though, now is under a total halted state after 1/11’s coup d’état. So, our NS Structure never got a chance to build itself in a proper shape.

But, what Mash told here, as a suggestion, where he never told to adopt American NS system. Or if he says so, will it be wrong? do we have a lot of better examples? Everyone knows about notorious chapters in American NS structure those we often watch in movies, but this is an absolute truth, that not for a single term, US’s National Security structure has been ran by the military all in all. Military men came to power of agencies like NSA, CIA but that’s just because the President wanted so & the senate approved. Neither the President nor the Senate approved their Generals to be the chief, under any kind of pressure. If someone wants to put an example of a completely democracy-ruled National Security Structure, one of its claimers is America. Thats why Mash has put examples from US I guess. He just wanted to say that their is no alternative of having a NS structure that will sustain democracy in every means.

8 Responses to “A Suggestion”

  1. Gulf War said

    [...] A Suggestion [...]

  2. Blazin said

    Shob-i shunlam…

    But didn’t writers understand the motive of this present military Government?

    There was no NS Council in Bangladesh ever-since our liberation. So, vital decisions over country’s NS structure fully were up to the Head of the State, to be precise to the leading persons of the Government. At this situation, military high-command was not authorized to have any say if they were not invited. But this military government want to keep an arrangement were Democratic government will have to invite military masterminds while taking any secret (or stern) decision due to National Security. I am not saying that Military personnel’s involvement in Government’s NS moves will be bad, but we have to understand the motive of present military government. They are trying to establish, constitutionally a more influential role of Military upon the civil administration. Writers have put examples from US National Security Structures at every single idea they have proposed, but they haven’t mentioned it for a single time that, National Security is the one of most stubborn excuses in America to propagate anything US Administrative people want, that can be bad for America, or may be good, but that will be definitely good for those people personally.

    However, those who have written this, are experts. They have tried honestly to propose a more-democratic model of National Security Structure of Bangladesh. But they have pulled examples from the NS Structure of America, which won’t be a good reference, to establish a Democracy-friendly NS Structure in a third-world nation like Bangladesh.

  3. xanthis said

    Hmm…

    So far I understood, you have tried to notify two things. One is, this NSC proposition of this military Government, by which, they are trying to dig out some way to gain more influential hold over the civil administration regarding NS. And the other is, Mash’s model is inappropriate because an America based model won’t work in a third world nation like Bangladesh.

    Well,
    The first point you get, I fully agree with that. Mash has already put an example of Thailand, where he said, “…however, the National Security Council is often used to exert military control over policy, even after power is handed over to civilian governments (Thailand is an example of this)…”. I ain’t too hopeful about this regime’s intention anything better than that of Thailand’s military.

  4. BDThinker said

    What about Mr. Blazin’s second point? Is really Mash’s model is inappropriate for Bangladesh?

    My opinion is, no, Mash’s model sounds no inappropriate to me.

  5. xanthis said

    Response to #1 & #3 is quite long, so I have extended the post. Look for the response at the bottom of the post. Thank You.

  6. Purana Paltan said

    Blazin, I didnt think Mash/Sikder actually “proposed” the set up of an NSC in Bangladesh. Actually they were saying that if even in the most powerful country NSC is so restrictive, there’s really no need for it in Bangladesh. The last line is significant: “Even in the United States, which faces the most complex external security environment in the world, the National Security Council remains a purely advisory tool for elected governments to use, with a focus on external, not domestic, issues, and commanded in both letter and spirit by civilians, not the military. In a country where power belongs to the people, national security policy has been no exception, even in times of turbulence and war.”

    NSC idea in Bangladesh is very dangerous. Power needs to go back to the people and their elected reps.

  7. Mash said

    Hi Xanthis, thank you for posting our article on your blog. However, I do want to clarify that the article is not proposing the creation of a National Security Council. We are advising against forming an NSC in Bangladesh because of the dangers of institutionalizing a military takeover.

    We used the example of the NSC in the United States to show how the civilian government in a stable democracy uses the NSC to coordinate foreign policy, not as a tool to control its own people. We also wrote about a different and more dangerous form of the NSC – that which is used by military regimes to control the civilian government (and this will be the case in Bangladesh).

    By the law of the land, the military has a very limited role in the US. They also play a very limited role in the US NSC. Civilian control of the military in the United States is absolute. The military is forbidden from engaging in the political arena. The need to keep civilian control of the military dates back to America’s founding. We quoted James Madison, one of America’s founding fathers, to demonstrate this tradition. We quoted Madison as follows:

    “A standing force, therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a necessary, provision. On the smallest scale it has its inconveniences. On an extensive scale its consequences may be fatal. On any scale it is an object of laudable circumspection and precaution. A wise nation will combine all these considerations; and, whilst it does not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become essential to its safety, will exert all its prudence in diminishing both the necessity and the danger of resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its liberties.”

    In a country like Bangladesh, the concept of an NSC will be used as a vehicle for the military to exert political control over the elected government. There are no checks on the BD military from intervening as it is. Institutionalizing an NSC would make this situation even worse. What we need is for the military to return to the barracks. We do not need to institutionalize the military’s control over the civilians via an NSC such as has been the case in Pakistan. We argued in the conclusion that for Bangladesh NSC seems to be unnecessary and carries the risk of giving the military control over the elected government. We said in the conclusion:

    But what remains unquestionable is that in the US, the NSC’s role has been restricted carefully to prevent military interference in elected authority. In contrast, in countries like Turkey and Pakistan, such councils are set up essentially to retain and exert military control over a wide range of policy. This is potentially dangerous: it creates an unaccountable authority, compromises the value of democracy, and undermines the professional purpose and integrity of the military by thoroughly politicising it. But one thing that Pakistan and Turkey have in common is that they both face troubling external security environments. Bangladesh faces a far less complex external threat environment; therefore, any perceived benefit of setting up a National Security Council should be weighed carefully.

    Thanks,

    Mash

  8. xanthis said

    Blazin, BDThinker & PuranaPaltan!

    I think the debate is over. Mash himself made things clear (to me too :-) )

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